1. please read the instruction first.2. There are some questions requirs you to cite sources, I’will upload them soon! and only use the sources I provided. 3. remember to use the foootnotes. Thank you Below There are some question examples from instruction: What should the government of South Sudan and other actors prioritize in order to promote development in the country? Drawing on what you have learned this semester, lay out at least four strategies that the government of South Sudan and other actors should pursue to promote development and improve livelihoods in the country.What are the implications of this finding for goal of promoting economic development and reducing inequality more broadly?How might theorists of at least three of the following theoretical perspectives we studied (modernization theory, dependency theory, neoliberalism, developmental state theory, or post-developmentalism) explain the lack of progress in achieving gender equality and what would they suggest as possible strategies for improving the status of women?
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Global Inequality and Development
You may consult your class notes and any of the assigned course readings in
preparing your answers. Your answers should make an argument and present
evidence from course materials to support your argument. Stronger answers will
incorporate and analyze ideas from a broad range of the readings assigned across
the entire semester and draw on specific course readings and examples from course
readings/lecture to provide evidence to support your arguments.
You must properly cite all sources referenced in your answers using footnotes.
Your answers should be typed in Microsoft Word or Pages using 11 or 12 pt. font, 1 inch
margins, double-spaced and with footnotes.
Long Essay:
On May 12, the Republic of South Sudan will install a power-sharing government as
part of a recent peace deal negotiated to end the country’s nearly six-year civil war.
In his speech in 2011 celebrating South Sudan’s independence, President Salva Kiir
spoke about the arduous task that his new government faces to develop the
economy and reduce poverty. This July the country will celebrate its 8th year of
independence and the economic challenges facing the country are still enormous:
currently 43% of the population lives below the income poverty line (PPP $1.90/day),
life expectancy is only 56 years, and only 32% of adults are literate. As a result of
excessive corruption (the country is rated 179 out of 180 on Transparency
International’s Corruption Perceptions Index) and following six years of civil war, the
state and other political institutions are excessively weak.
•
What should the government of South Sudan and other actors prioritize in order
to promote development in the country?
Drawing on what you have learned this semester, lay out at least four strategies
that the government of South Sudan and other actors should pursue to
promote development and improve livelihoods in the country.
Note: Approximate word count for this answer: 750 words (excluding footnotes).
Short Essay:
Sustainable development goal #5 addresses gender equality, seeking to “Achieve
gender equality and empower all women and girls” by 2030. Yet, a recent assessment
of progress in achieving goal #5 notes that “While some forms of discrimination against
women and girls are diminishing, gender inequality continues to hold women back
and deprives them of basic rights and opportunities.”
•
•
What are the implications of this finding for goal of promoting economic
development and reducing inequality more broadly?
How might theorists of at least three of the following theoretical perspectives
we studied (modernization theory, dependency theory, neoliberalism,
developmental state theory, or post-developmentalism) explain the lack of
progress in achieving gender equality and what would they suggest as possible
strategies for improving the status of women?
Note: Approximate word count for this answer: 450 words (excluding footnotes).
Short answer:
President Trump’s 2020 budget request for foreign assistance from the US government,
was over 30 percent lower than the 2019 budget: $5.23 billion requested for 2019
versus $7.64 billion allocated for 2019.
Based on what you have learned about funding for development, including the
impacts and effectiveness of different types of funding sources:
•
Does a reduction in US foreign aid matter in terms of promoting greater global
equality and development? Why or why not?
Note: Approximate word count for this answer: 150 words (excluding footnotes).
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part iii
SLOW BUT STEADY
Copyright © 2004. Cambridge University Press. All rights reserved.
India
India at the end of the twentieth century was a poor economy, though one
with a substantial industrial base. In contrast to both Korea and Brazil,
India got off to a slow start, developing mainly in the second half of the
century. Even then, however, the pace of growth had been relatively slow,
picking up speed only toward the end. The state’s role in producing this
mixed economic outcome is analyzed in the next two chapters. It is proposed in Chapter 6 that the laissez-faire colonial state was partly responsible
for India’s sluggish economy in the first half of the century. By contrast,
the modern, interventionist state that replaced it at midcentury provided a
framework for modest economic growth and industrialization. This is analyzed in Chapter 7. A factor that contributed to the state’s inefficacy was
its fragmented-multiclass character, manifest especially in the considerable
gap between the state’s ambitions and capacities. A root cause of this state
“softness” was the need of the leaders to maintain a stable and legitimate
state within a diverse, relatively mobilized political society. State inefficacy,
in turn, limited the impact of state interventions and hurt the rate of industrial growth. The origins of both this fragmented-multiclass state and
the sluggish economy are analyzed first, followed by a discussion of how the
state managed eventually to facilitate slow but steady industrialization.
Kohli, Atul. State-Directed Development : Political Power and Industrialization in the Global Periphery,
Cambridge University Press, 2004. ProQuest Ebook Central,
http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/aul/detail.action?docID=275219.
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Kohli, Atul. State-Directed Development : Political Power and Industrialization in the Global Periphery,
Cambridge University Press, 2004. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/aul/detail.action?docID=275219.
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6
Origins of a Fragmented-Multiclass State and a
Sluggish Economy
Copyright © 2004. Cambridge University Press. All rights reserved.
Colonial India
Like Brazil, India is a case of mixed economic performance in the second
half of the twentieth century: more sluggish than rapidly industrializing
South Korea but with its diversified industrial base much sounder than
Nigeria. Any comparative analysis must therefore ask why India has been
as successful as it has been but also why it has not done better. The state
has played the central role in producing this mixed economic outcome,
the argument being that the modern, interventionist state that replaced
the laissez-faire colonial state at midcentury provided a framework for modest economic growth and industrialization, a clear improvement over the
nearly stagnant, free-market colonial economy that had preceded it. State
intervention also laid the groundwork for the emergence of a more vibrant
private economy toward the end of the century. At the same time, however, the fragmented-multiclass state that India inherited and created was
relatively inefficacious, characterized by a considerable gap between its ambitions and capacities. This state inefficacy, in turn, limited the impact of
state interventions and retarded the rate and pattern of industrialization.
The present chapter analyzes the impact of colonialism on the formation
of the Indian state and industrial economy, especially in the first half of
the twentieth century. Three lines of argument are developed, two concerning the political situation and one concerning the political economy. First,
the state that Indians inherited from their colonial past was modern and
democratic yet not all that effective as an economic actor. This state, as I
argue, was a product of both colonial construction and nationalist pressures
and design. The British in India created the basic state architecture: political
unity and centralized authority, a modern civil service and armed forces, the
rule of law and an independent judiciary, and rudiments of federalism and
democracy, with growing participation by Indians. While the political practices of the colonial state were mainly autocratic, the downward reach of the
state’s authority was nonetheless very limited, allowing a variety of local and
personalistic despotisms to flourish. This state, with its power compromises
Kohli, Atul. State-Directed Development : Political Power and Industrialization in the Global Periphery,
Cambridge University Press, 2004. ProQuest Ebook Central,
http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/aul/detail.action?docID=275219.
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Slow but Steady: India
with traditional elites and its laissez-faire character, was a fragmented, limited state in the making.
Second, India’s mass nationalist movement developed in opposition to
the colonial state as a vehicle for capturing state power. The political process
helped to create a sense of nation in India and generated political values that
placed a premium simultaneously on democracy and on statist developmentalism. But while India’s nationalist movement was a powerful oppositional
force, it never developed a corresponding organizational structure, such as
a tightly knit political party or even a coherent political strategy that would
allow it to redesign the state in accordance with its developmental ambitions.
The multiclass social base also made for a movement that had to reconcile
many competing forces as it sought to define its ideology, policies, and political strategies. The political legacy of India’s nationalist movement was thus
ambiguous. On the one hand, it succeeded in mobilizing effectively against
colonial rule, in consolidating the Indian “nation,” and in pushing India
toward a full democracy. On the other hand, it was not a cohesive political
force that could define priorities clearly and see them to completion. Once
victorious, an amorphous, multiclass nationalist movement that sought to
expand the state’s role in the economy came to be grafted onto a modern but
fragmented colonial state. The result was a fragmented-multiclass sovereign
state, whose developmental inefficacy has remained at the heart of India’s
lackluster economic performance.
Finally, the subcontinent has for a long time been characterized by a
low-technology, low-productivity agrarian economy. The political instability
of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries also did not augur well
for spontaneous economic progress. The British in this nineteenth-century
setting provided political unity, a “national” market, and infrastructure, but
these developments were insufficient for sustained economic growth of any
type, including industrialization. Among the proximate factors militating
against industrialization during the colonial phase were considerations of
both supply and demand: low rates of savings and investment, primitive
technology, and a poor economy with limited internal demand.
At a more distant level of causation, the negative role of the colonial
state was significant insofar as it absorbed savings, failed to invest in such
growth-promoting activities as technology development, and maintained an
open economy that could overwhelm any indigenous dynamism that might
have emerged. It is no accident that when indigenous capitalism and industry did emerge – mainly in the 1930s, though there was some earlier
as well – it was primarily of the import-substitution variety, encouraged by
a set of colonial policies whose rationale was more financial than industrypromoting. The consequences were, nevertheless, significant. While the role
of industry in the overall economy at the time of independence was, given
India’s large size, extremely small – considerably smaller, for example, than
in either Korea or Brazil – India emerged from colonialism with a significant
Kohli, Atul. State-Directed Development : Political Power and Industrialization in the Global Periphery,
Cambridge University Press, 2004. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/aul/detail.action?docID=275219.
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group of indigenous capitalists involved in industry. Equally important, these
capitalists and India’s nationalist political elite agreed that rapid future industrialization would require protection and active state intervention.
These three themes of colonial state construction, the nationalist movement, and the colonial political economy are discussed below, keeping in
mind the following points. First, colonialism in India lasted for more than
two centuries, up until the middle of the twentieth century. I summarize the
first century or more of colonialism as historical background, giving some
attention to post-1857 developments, that is, to the period following the
establishment of formal British Crown rule in India in 1857, and then focus
on the first half of the twentieth century. Second, given the size, complexity,
and regional variations of the subcontinent, the national level focus can be
misleading, certainly more so than, say, in the case of Korea. But it is impossible to be comprehensive on that score, though I do refer to some of the most
obvious internal variations in due course. It is to be hoped that the perspective adopted here is plausible and offers some new insights. Finally, it must
be emphasized that the historiography on colonial India is extremely rich,
diverse, and abounds with controversies. The broad synthetic account that
follows is adequate only for a comparative analysis of the type undertaken
in this book. Students of colonial India ought to familiarize themselves with
such alternative approaches to the subject as are provided by the Cambridge
School, the nationalists, the Marxists, and the subaltern scholars.1
Copyright © 2004. Cambridge University Press. All rights reserved.
I. Historical Background
Prior to the British rule, the geographical space in which now exist the countries of Pakistan, India, and Bangladesh was at times more politically unified
and at times less so.2 The Mughals, who controlled large tracts of northern
and central India prior to the British, ruled India quite effectively, especially
at the height of the dynasty under Akbar (1556–1605).3 His empire has been
described as “probably the most powerful in the world at the time.”4 Court
administration within the empire was relatively systematic; written records
were maintained in Persian; a legal system modeled on Persian laws was in
place; a bureaucracy of sorts existed, with court-appointed officials spread
all the way from the center to the periphery; and, of course, there was considerable capacity to mobilize an armed force. The latter was related to the
Mughal state’s capacity to extract taxes from the largely agrarian society: For
1
2
3
4
For a brief review of these approaches and for a guide to further reading, see Bipan Chandra
et al., India’s Struggle for Independence, 1857–1947 (New Delhi: Penguin, 1988), 16–22.
For a quick overview of Indian history, see Hermann Kulke and Dietmar Rothermund, A
History of India (London: CroomHelm, 1986).
On the nature of the state and the agrarian economy under the Mughals, see Irfan Habib,
The Agrarian System of Mughal India, 1556–1707 (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1963).
Stanley Wolpert, A New History of India (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), 134.
Kohli, Atul. State-Directed Development : Political Power and Industrialization in the Global Periphery,
Cambridge University Press, 2004. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/aul/detail.action?docID=275219.
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example, it has been estimated that the Mughals may have collected as much
as 15 percent of the national income in taxes, whereas the British in India
extracted about half of this amount.5 This substantial revenue base also supported the construction of numerous monuments and a lavish life-style both
at the court and among the aristocracy.
Despite this considerable political sophistication, Mughal India was a
premodern agrarian bureaucracy. Notwithstanding the claims of some nationalist historiography, it did not demonstrate much of an impulse toward
modernity; it was neither on the verge of modern statehood nor on the
verge of an industrial revolution. While these are large and controversial
historical issues, a few salient observations are relevant for the current discussion. First, the Mughal state was mainly a personalistic and patrimonial
state: “the concept of ‘public’ service . . . had no roots in Indian soil. . . . In
fact, under the Mughals, there was nothing like the modern concept of the
state. . . . The Mughal king did not become subject of depersonalization.”6
Additionally, in order to maintain political control while securing agrarian
surplus, Mughal emperors parceled out land to court favorites and other
local influentials, who would extract taxes, keep a share, and pass on some
set proportion to higher authorities. These tax farmers in no way owned
the lands they controlled; rather, they always faced the possibility of being
moved elsewhere. This mechanism aimed to minimize any threats to the
emperor from independent centers of power. But the net result was that
those with access to agrarian surplus had little incentive to reinvest, leading
to minimal improvement in agricultural productivity – and to conspicuous
consumption.7 And finally, while a fairly sophisticated commercial sector
existed, including overseas trade in textiles during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, this economy was not moving toward a spontaneous industrial revolution for numerous reasons: There had been no prior agricultural
revolution; technology was primitive and there was little interest in Western
scientific developments; mass demand was limited; and commercial and industrial organization was weak. Moreover, as the seventeenth century wore
on, and the Mughal empire declined, India saw growing political instability,
warfare, and the fragmentation of the political economy.8
The empire disintegrated in the first half of the eighteenth century,
as the result of “inter-regional religious wars, court incompetence, greedy
5
6
7
8
See Angus Maddison, Class Structure and Economic Growth: India and Pakistan since the Moghals
(London: George Allen & Unwin, 1971), 45.
See B. B. Misra, The Bureaucracy in India: An Historical Analysis of Development up to 1947 (Delhi:
Oxford University Press, 1977), 387.
See, for example, W. H. Moreland, India at the Death of Akbar (London: Macmillan, 1920).
See Tapan Ray Chaudhri, “The Mid-Eighteenth-Century Background,” in Dharma Kumar,
ed., The Cambridge Economic History of India, vol. 2: C. 1757–c. 1970 (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1983), 35.
Kohli, Atul. State-Directed Development : Political Power and Industrialization in the Global Periphery,
Cambridge University Press, 2004. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/aul/detail.action?docID=275219.
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Colonial India
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factionalism, and traditional invasions.”9 Meanwhile by the end of the seventeenth century the British in the guise of the East India Company were
already well established on the two coasts, quietly prospering as traders and
local political brokers. The …
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